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Family-friendly employment laws (re)assessed: the potential of care ethics.   
Grace James, University of Reading*.  
 
Abstract 
In light of various reforms in recent years, this article provides a (re)assessment of the broad 
package of family-friendly employment rights and relevant dispute resolution procedure now 
available to pregnant workers and working carers. It exposes how the realities of working 
life for many pregnant workers and carers and the long standing desire to promote gender 
equality in informal care-work remain at odds with the legal framework. An argument is 
presented in favour of an approach that, based upon the concept of care ethics, better 
engages with the impact of the provisions upon crucial interdependent care relationships.   
 
1. Introduction 
In many ways, since the introduction of shared parental leave (SPL) in 20151, the family-
friendly framework of rights now appears complete: mothers and fathers can ‘take 
advantage of additional flexibility in the way they choose to care for a new arrival to the 
family’2 and this builds upon a fairly generous maternity leave entitlement, a right to 
paternity leave, a right to request flexible working and protection against discrimination on 
the grounds of pregnancy or maternity. The EU has also developed its reconciliation agenda 
over the years and this, in the main, has positively influenced national laws.3 But, as will be 
argued in the following section, appearances can be deceptive and the existing package of 
rights available to working parents is flawed: it remains focussed, in practice, on new 
mothers and does little to help challenge traditional constructions of care as a female 
responsibility or challenge the dominant ethos of the labour market, which promotes the 
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1
 See the Shared Parental Leave Regulations 2014 SI 2014/3050. For further details see ACAS guidelines 
(www.acas.org.uk) or Maternity Action’s information sheet at http://www.maternityaction.org.uk/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Shared-parental-leave-and-pay-2015.pdf.  For comment see G. Mitchell, 
‘Encouraging Fathers to Care: The Children and Families Act 2014 and Shared Parental Leave’ (2015) 44 
Industrial Law Journal 123.  
2
 ACAS (2015) Shared Parental Leave: A Good Practice Guide for Employers and Employees, 1.    
3
 However, for an interesting special issue critiquing EU reconciliation measures see Journal of Social Welfare 
and Family Law (2015) Vol 37(3). 
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unencumbered worker4 as ideal and fails to reflect the interdependence of care across our 
life course. Moreover these (flawed) laws are not adequately supported by the current 
dispute resolution infrastructure and processes, and exist at a time when successive 
governments have failed to effectively tackle pregnancy and maternity related workplace 
discrimination. In addition, austerity measures and related reforms have increased the 
vulnerability of many workers, weakening the ability of these laws to adequately protect 
those who are mistreated in the workplace as a result of pregnancy or care-giving 
responsibilities.5 These key concerns are discussed in detail below: section 2 considers (a) 
the legal framework of rights6 and (b) the dispute resolution procedures in place. In the 
latter, particular attention is given to their ineffectiveness as a means of supporting those 
who experience unlawful treatment at work due to pregnancy and maternity.  Section 3 
then outlines how an alternative approach, based upon care ethics, could potentially help 
promote a framework that better reflects the inter-dependence of care and better 
challenges gendered constructions of care-work and labour market participation.  
 
2. The limits of existing provisions  
Overall, many of the inadequacies of family-friendly employment laws and the processes 
that support their enforcement reflect the fact that developments in this area of social 
policy are precarious: vulnerable to economic downturns and often shelved or diluted when 
perceived and presented as a burden on business. Family-friendly policies are rarely 
prioritised for long enough to ensure that policy makers engage with the issues in a 
meaningful way. Indeed, the topic fell out of the policy spotlight when priorities shifted in 
light of economic hardship. This may be, as Rubery and Rafferty have noted more generally 
                                                          
4
 S. Berns, Women Going Backwards: Law and Change in a Family-Unfriendly Society (Alderhot, Ashgate,2002);  
J. Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It (Oxford, OUP, 2000)  
and C. McGlynn, ‘Work, Family and Parenthood: The European Union Agenda’ in J. Conaghan, R. Fischl and K. 
Klare (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformations, Practices and Possibilities (Oxford, OUP, 
2005).  
5
 For a discussion of how austerity cuts following the 2008 crisis impacted on reconciliation in the EU see R. 
Guerrina, ‘Socio-Economic Challenges to Work-Life Balance in times of Crisis’  (2015) 37 Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law, 336. See also special issue of International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 
(2013 Vol.33(9 /10)critiquing work/life balance during economic crisis and J. Rubery and A. Rafferty, ‘Women 
and Recession Revisited’ (2013)27 Work, Employment and Society 414 and J. Lewis, ‘Work/family 
reconciliation, equal opportunities and social policies: The interpretation of policy trajectories at the EU level 
and the meaning of gender equality 1997-2005’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 13, 420. 
6
 Although, given that the majority of established rights have received considerable academic attention, the 
majority of critique in this section is of the new shared parental leave provisions.   
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in relation to work-life balance policies across the EU, a weakness in framing legislation by 
focussing, as this area of social policy often does, on the business case. As they put it, 
‘significant changes in priorities can be expected in a context where businesses can afford to 
be less concerned about retaining staff, welfare state expenditure is being cut back and the 
EU and national governments can no longer assume that work is available to all who seek 
it’.7 An example in the UK is the shelving by New Labour of plans to extend the payment of 
statutory maternity pay (SMP) to a full year due to the economic instability caused by 
recession. Such re-prioritisation reflects the continued undervaluing of parenting and care in 
general.8 In this section, two examples demonstrate the inadequacy of the current 
approach: the limits of the legal framework of rights available and the dispute resolution 
procedures are discussed.  
a. Limits of the current legal framework 
At the core of the package of rights on offer is a generous maternity leave entitlement9 that 
has been extended several times and is available to employees10 including those who adopt 
and, more recently, those who have a baby through a surrogacy arrangement.11 Currently 
available for a maximum period of 12 months, the leave is divided into ordinary (26 weeks) 
and additional (26 weeks) leave. SMP is paid, to those who qualify, for 9 months, earnings 
related for the first six weeks at 90% of her weekly earnings and then payable at SMP rate, 
or 90% of average earnings if that is less, for the remaining 33 weeks. Those who do not 
qualify for SMP may claim maternity allowance. The final three months are unpaid. Whereas 
                                                          
7
 J. Rubery and A. Rafferty, ‘Women and Recession Revisited’ (2013) 27 Work, Employment and Society (2013) 
27(3) 414, 418. 
8
 See for example, S. Fredman, Women and the Law (Oxford, OUP, 1997). See also J. Herring, Caring and the 
Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) and N. Busby, A Right to Care?: Unpaid Care Work in European 
Employment Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011).  
9
 See S71-75 ERA 1996 and Regulations 4-12A of the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 (SI 
1999/3312). 
10
 Of course, many working parents and carers are not employees and, as Fredman points out, formulating 
rights for these remains a central challenge: see S. Fredman,  ‘Reversing Roles: Bringing Men into the Frame’ 
(2014) 10 International Journal of Law in Context, 442. 
11
 The Children and Families Act 2014. Thus providing a new right for this cohort of surrogate parents who 
have, in recent years, been unable to establish equal treatment with birth mothers: the CJEU ruled in C.D. v S.T 
C-167/12 CJEU (2014)  that denial of maternity or adoptive leave and pay to surrogate parents is not contrary 
to EU law as it doesn’t fall within the EU Pregnant Workers Directive (as the claimant was not pregnant) and is 
not discriminatory contrary to ETD as a man entering a surrogacy arrangement would be treated in the same 
way. See further, E. Caracciolo di Torella and P. Foubert, ‘Surrogacy, Pregnancy and Maternity Rights: A Missed 
Opportunity For a More Coherent Regime of Parental Rights in the EU?’ (2015) 40 The European Law Review 
40, 52. 
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maternity leave entitlement is fairly generous the ability to take advantage of the full right 
to twelve months leave still varies according to personal economic wellbeing. A maximum of 
ten keep in touch (or KIT) days are available to new mothers, and can help boost household 
income during leave, but only if she has agreed with her employer that they are paid at full 
contractual rate.12  
Laws are also in place to protect pregnant women from detrimental treatment at work. 
Pregnancy and maternity are a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010, and 
s.18 clearly states that it is discriminatory to treat a woman unfavourably during the 
‘protected period’,13 because of pregnancy, illness suffered as a result of pregnancy or 
because she is on compulsory maternity leave or is exercising, seeking to exercise or has 
exercised or sought to exercise the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave. If the 
‘unfavourable treatment’ is a dismissal it is also likely to be automatically unfair contrary to 
s.99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.14 Such treatment is also contrary to relevant EU 
legislation15 and there is ample progressive EU case law on the issue reflecting an approach 
which, although not devoid of criticism,16 has been generally purposive over the years. 
However, the ineffectiveness of the available legal protection is reflected in recent research 
findings: the Coalition Government funded a major joint investigation by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) to 
                                                          
12
 See G. James, ‘Enjoy your leave but “keep in touch”: help to maintain parent/workplace relationships’ (2007) 
36 ILJ 313.  
13
 Defined as beginning ‘when the pregnancy begins, and ends — (a) if she has the right to ordinary and 
additional maternity leave, at the end of the additional maternity leave period or (if earlier) when she returns 
to work after the pregnancy; (b)if she does not have that right, at the end of the period of 2 weeks beginning 
with the end of the pregnancy’ (s18(6)). The employer does however need to be aware of the pregnancy in 
order to trigger legal protection – see Del Monte Foods v Mundon (IRLR 224 EAT), discussed in G. James  The 
Legal Regulation of Pregnancy and Parenting in the Workplace (London, Routledge, 2009) at 59. For an 
interesting re-writing of the judgment from a feminist perspective see R. Horton and G. James ‘Mundon v Del 
Monte Foods Ltd: judgment’ in R. Hunter, C. McGlynn  and E. Rackley (eds) Feminist Judgments: from Theory to 
Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010).  
14
 Hence it doesn’t require 2 years continued service, as is the case for the majority of unfair dismissal claims: 
ERA 1996 S108(1). 
15
 Protection for pregnant and new mothers at work has been a focus of 2 key Directives: The Equal Treatment 
Directive 76/207/EEC (now, Recast Directive 2006/54/EC) and the Pregnant Workers Directive 92/85/EEC. For 
a discussion, see N. Busby and G. James  ‘Regulating Working Families in the European Union: A History of 
Disjointed Strategies’ (2015) 37 Journal of Social, Welfare and Family Law 295 and P. Foubert and S. Imamovic 
‘The Pregnant Workers Directive: Must Do Better: Lessons to be Learned from Strasbourg’(2015) 37 Journal of 
Social, Welfare and Family Law 309.  
16
 See ibid N. Busby and G. James; P. Foubert and S. Imamovic. See also, E. Caracciolo di Torella and A. 
Masselot ‘The ECJ case law on issues related to pregnancy and maternity: an attempt of classification’ 
(2001)26 European Law Review 239; -260; C. McGlynn ‘European Union family values: ideologies of “family” 
and “motherhood” in European Union law’ (2001)8 Social Politics 325; G.  James, supra n.12.     
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consider the prevalence and nature of pregnancy and maternity discrimination and 
disadvantage in the workplace.17 The findings are depressingly familiar.18 The research 
estimates than around 54,000 women are annually dismissed, made compulsorily 
redundant while others are treated so poorly that they feel they have to leave their jobs, 
opening potential claims to constructive dismissal and discrimination. Around 100,000 
women a year experience harassment and negative comments relating to pregnancy and 
flexible working from employers and colleagues. One in three felt unsupported by their 
employer at some point when pregnant or returning to work and one in ten are discouraged 
from attending antenatal appointments.  
For new fathers or partners, the right to ordinary paternity leave was introduced in 2002.19 
It was heralded as a new focus in family-friendly employment laws but, being of two weeks 
duration, paid at a flat rate equivalent to SMP and restricted to employees with 26 weeks 
continuous service at the 15th week before childbirth, the provisions were never comparable 
to maternity entitlement and never likely to dramatically alter father’s traditional patterns 
of engagement in household chores, parenting or paid work.20 However, in 2010 the 
Coalition Government introduced the right to additional paternity leave (APL),21 now 
                                                          
17
 See EHRC/BIS (2015) Pregnancy and Maternity-Related Discrimination and Disadvantage First Findings: 
Surveys of Employers and Mothers (BIS Research Paper No 235), available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448162/BIS-15-447-
pregnancy-and-maternity-related-discrimination-and-disadvantage.pdf.  
18
 The true extent of this was first aired publicly in a EU funded report by the, then, Equal Opportunities 
Commission (EOC – now the Equality and Human Rights Commission, EHRC) in 2005: Greater Expectations: 
Final Report of the EOC’s Investigation into Discrimination against New and Expectant Mothers in the 
Workplace (EOC (2005) Greater Expectations: Final Report of the EOC’s Investigation into Discrimination 
Against New and Expectant Mothers in the Workplace, Manchester: EOC available at 
http://www.maternityaction.org.uk/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/eocpregnancydiscrimgreaterexpectations.pdf)  provided damning evidence of ‘one 
of the most hidden and damaging forms of workplace injustice’ ( at p7). It reported that almost half of all 
pregnant workers and those on maternity leave experienced some kind of discrimination and that, annually, 
over 30,000 women were sacked, made redundant or left work as a result.  
19
 Under the Paternity and Adoptive Leave Regulations (2002) SI 2788. 
20
 See E. Caracciolo di Torella ‘New Labour, New Dads – The Impact of Family Friendly Legislation on Fathers’ 
(2007) Industrial Law Journal 318. For a discussion of how fathers are often ignored in relevant legal 
frameworks E. Caracciolo Di Torella ‘Men in the Work/Family Reconciliation Discourse: The Swallows That Did 
Not Make Summer?’ (2015) 33 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 334. R Collier ‘Feminising the 
Workplace? Law, the ‘good parent’ and the ‘problem of men’ in A. Morris  and T. O’Donnel (eds) Feminist 
Perspectives on Employment Law (London, Cavendish, 1999); R. Collier and S. Sheldon  Fragmented Fatherhood  
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008); Fredman, supra n.10. 
21
 Additional Paternity Leave Regulations 2010. For comment, see M. Weldon-Johns ‘The Additional 
Paternity Leave Regulations 2010: A New Dawn or More “Sound Bite” Legislation?’ (2011) 33Journal 
of Social Welfare and Family Law, 25. 
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replaced by shared parental leave (SPL). APL was, at the time, a momentous step forward in 
terms of father-friendly employment rights. It allowed fathers and partners to take paternity 
leave of up to 26 weeks (minimum of two weeks) before the child’s first birthday. The father 
had to satisfy the same continuity criteria as for paternity leave. Significantly though, it was 
only available if the mother returned to work early and transferred the remainder of her 
leave entitlement to him and it could be paid if the mother transferred leave where she 
would have been eligible for SMP.  The APL provisions were, thus, tangled up with the 
mother’s leave and did little to challenge the normative expectation that mothers are 
primarily responsible for, and that they are the most naturally inclined towards and most 
adept at, caring for children - a patriarchal construction that has long been contested in 
feminist literature.22   
The EU parental leave provisions add another layer of rights to these parental entitlements.  
The Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations23  offer some parents the opportunity to take 
up to 18 weeks leave24 before the child’s 18th birthday.25 However, the entitlement is 
restricted in a number of ways: it is only available to employees with a year’s continuous 
employment, has to be taken in blocks of one week minimum and 4 weeks maximum, can 
be delayed by employers if to grant it would unduly disrupt the functioning of the 
workplace, and, most significantly, it is unpaid. Its use is therefore fundamentally limited, 
reflecting the significantly weak engagement with work-care issues at EU level.26  
To this framework of employment rights the previous (Coalition) Government recently 
added the SPL provisions, which came into force in December 2014 and apply to parents of 
children due on or after 5th April 2015.  SPL replaced the APL provision and is also available 
                                                          
22
 See, for example, M. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual family and Other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies (London, Routledge, 1995);  M. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge, CUP, 
2000); S Ortner, ‘Is female to male as nature is to culture?’, in J. Landes (ed.) Feminism, the Public and the 
Private (Oxford, OUP, 1998); C. Patemen, ‘Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy’, in S. Benn and 
G. Gaus (eds) Public and Private in Social Life (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1983); A. Rich, Of Woman Born, 
(London, Vigaro Press, 1977);  C. Smart, ‘Deconstructing motherhood’ in E. Silva (ed.) Good Enough Mothering? 
Feminist Perspectives on Lone Motherhood (London: Routledge, 1996) discussed further in James, supra n.10 
at [9-18]. 
23
 Located in Part III of the Maternity and Parental Leave etc Regulations 1999 SI 1999/3312. 
24
 Increased in March 2013 from 13 weeks - see Parental Leave EU Directive Regulations 2013 SI 2013/238. 
25
 Extended in April 2015 (Maternity and Parental Leave etc. (Amendment) Regulations 2014/3221).  
26
 See Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law special edition, supra n.3.  
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to eligible adopting parents and those intending to have a child born through a surrogacy27 
arrangement. Although the first two weeks maternity leave following childbirth remain 
compulsory (four weeks for factory workers),28 under the SPL provisions a woman who is 
eligible for statutory maternity/adoptive leave and pay  is now entitled to bring both of 
these to an early end and elect for SPL instead. This new provision builds upon, but is subtly 
different from, the APL provisions.29 Under the latter, a mother could transfer a block of up 
to 26 weeks maternity leave entitlement (post compulsory leave) if she chose to return to 
work early. SPL allows eligible parents more flexibility to share the leave in various ways: for 
example they may choose to take some leave at the same time or take it in turns to have 
periods of leave to look after the child. Indeed, even if the mother has no eligible partner 
with whom to share that leave, the provision may still offer her some flexibility in terms of 
when and how she uses her leave entitlement – perhaps returning to paid employment for a 
block of time whilst a partner or grandparent or other carer is able to care for her child. In 
addition, where a father is entitled to SPL and pay and a mother isn’t, perhaps because she 
is self-employed, the father can take SPL while the mother returns to work – a situation that 
was not possible previously as the APL entitlement was intrinsically tied to and dependent 
upon the right of the mother to statutory maternity leave.   
 
However, there are flaws in the new provisions. First, the core SPL rights are fairly complex. 
This, unlike maternity leave, is not a day-one right. There are separate criteria for the 
mother and father/partner and separate criteria for SPL and SPL pay and these also include 
various notice requirements. The scope for confusion in understanding these eligibility 
conditions and notice requirements is vast.30 Both parties wanting to take SPL must give 
                                                          
27
 See Caracciolo di Torella and Foubert, supra n.11.There are also now plans to extend SPL to include 
working grandparents by 2018 (see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-announces-
major-new-extension-of-shared-parental-leave-and-pay-to-working-grandparents) 
28
 S.72 ERA. 
29
 Set out in the Additional Paternity Leave Regulations 2010 SI 2010/1055. For a discussion of the controversy 
surrounding compulsory maternity leave see J. Suk, ‘From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and Life 
Cycle in the United States and Europe’ (2012) 60 The American Journal of Comparative Law 76.  
30
 Indeed, to be effective, such provisions require a very knowledgeable and supportive employer and line-
manager, especially as refusal of blocks of leave does not need to be justified - see G. Mitchell ‘Encouraging 
Fathers to Care: The Children and Families Act 2014 and Shared Parental Leave’ (2015) 44 ILJ, 123. It is telling 
that popular commentator, Daniel Barnett, referred in correspondence with those signed up to his email list to 
the provisions as ‘the yukkiest, horriblest law ever’ and the BIS guidance for employers lists no less than 96 
frequently asked questions (see 
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effective notice to their employers. This, according to the Regulations, includes giving 
written notice of entitlement and intention to take SPL a minimum of eight weeks prior to 
each SPL period. The detailed notice provisions are confusing and cumbersome. They, as is 
the case with so much of the law that relates to this area, are insensitive to the realities of 
parenting and reflect a lack of consideration of the unpredictable nature of childbirth and 
needs of parents during what can be an incredibly emotionally and physically draining 
period. For example, a working couple may have planned, pre-birth, to organise their leave 
so that the mother avails herself of maternity leave for the first 3 months before they opt 
for shared parental leave and divide the remaining leave between them. However, if the 
birth is more traumatic than anticipated, or the baby or mother requires extra care, they 
may need to exchange the maternity leave and pay for SPL straight away, following ordinary 
paternity leave and compulsory maternity leave entitlements, so as to allow both parents to 
take leave at the same time during what may be, or may become, a critical and stressful 
time – especially if they have other care-giving responsibilities. Given these notice periods, 
they would not only have to understand and comply with these procedures during a 
stressful time, they would have to wait two months from the delivery of these notifications 
to begin SPL. It is clear that this is an area where the needs of employers are prioritised: 
whilst the benefit of adequate notice to workplace functioning is clear, the reality of 
childbirth and parenting – workplace reconciliation is at odds with this dogmatic approach. 
The implications of this in the light of cuts in legal aid funding and the closure of many  legal 
advice centres is of particular concern (see further  below) and tarnishes the initial gloss of 
SPL. 
 
Second, SPL is paid at the flat statutory rate from day one, whereas SMP is linked to the 
mother’s earnings for the first six week. Hence, a couple contemplating sharing the 
childcare during this initial period following the birth may well be reluctant to elect for SPL if 
to do so has negative financial implications for the family. This period post the birth can be 
particularly intense for most couples but even more so where, for example,  the birth was 
by caesarean or complicated in some way, there were multiple births or the family have 
other care-giving responsibilities. Adopting parents might also feel that this period of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417505/bis-14-1329-
Employers-technical-guide-to-shared-parental-leave-and-pay-1.pdf).  
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adjustment would benefit from having both parties present. Yet, the flexibility provided in 
theory by SPL is, because of the financial consequences, unlikely to be a realistic option for 
many. The equal parenting ideal at the heart of SPL is, in practice, compromised by 
restricted financial practicalities during the first six weeks - and potentially longer if the 
mother is able to access a preferential occupational maternity leave package.           
 
In addition to the core leave provisions outlined so far, a key initiative that gives working 
parents, and carers with elderly dependants, a group that is often underrepresented in this 
debate,31 a useful right, beyond legislation that focusses on the first 12 months post birth is 
the right to request flexible working.32 It allows eligible employees to ask for modifications 
to be made in terms of how, when and where they work, providing these parents with the 
opportunity to re-structure their working lives in a way that eases the pressures involved 
with providing daily informal care and participating in employment. An employee must have 
been employed continuously for 26 weeks before s/he can request to work flexibly. 
Employers now, since 2014, have a duty to deal with requests in a ‘reasonable manner’ and 
within a ‘reasonable’ period of time33 but if an application is refused, and there are several 
broad acceptable reasons for refusal,34 the employee is not eligible to re-apply for 12 
months.  
If accepted, contractual changes are permanent,35 which can be detrimental and, ironically, 
stifle flexibility longer term: for example, a father’s employer agrees to a schedule that 
allows him to take his son to school in the morning and work later to make up the hours, but 
as the child grows the family find that he is better able to attend pre-school care, but 
benefits from support with homework or escorting to clubs in the evenings so the 
arrangement is no longer as useful as it initially was and modification would better enable 
                                                          
31
 See G. James and E. Spruce ‘Workers with Elderly Dependants: Employment Law’s response to the Latest 
Care-giving Conundrum’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies 463. 
32
 S80F-80I ERA 1996, the Flexible Working (Eligibility, Complaints and Remedies) Regulations 2002 (SI 
2002/3236) and the Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) 2002 (SI 2002/3207). For comment see 
Anderson, L (2003). 
33
 ACAS has produced a statutory code of practice on the meaning of ‘reasonable’ - 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/f/e/Code-of-Practice-on-handling-in-a-reasonable-manner-requests-to-
work-flexibly.pdf 
34
 Including the burden of additional costs and detrimental impact upon work quality. 
35
 Compare with New Zealand - see A. Masselot, ‘The rights and realities of balancing work and family life in 
New Zealand’ in N. Busby and G. James (eds) Families, Care-giving and Paid Work: Challenging Labour Law in 
the 21
st
 Century (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011) at 69.   
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them to function as a family. Moreover, although originally restricted to parents and then 
extended to those with caring responsibilities for adults the right to request has now, since 
2014, been extended to all eligible employees.36  This recent change is both a blessing and a 
curse. It is a blessing because it increases the potential for all workers to experience a 
healthier work-life balance and helps normalise the notion that we all have a need to do so. 
It is a curse however, because the extension to non-carers potentially dilutes this law’s use 
for working carers. Employers are under no obligation to prioritise the needs of working 
carers above the desires of other workers for flexibility. Using the example above, the 
carer’s request to start a shift later to enable care-work may be rejected more easily if the 
employer has already agreed to allow another worker, who perhaps likes to leave home 
later in order to avoid rush hour traffic or attend a class at the company’s gym, the right to 
do so. Moreover, the right to request continues to place the onus on the individual, carer or 
non-carer, to opt out of what is constructed as ‘full’ and ‘valued’ labour market participation 
- so rigid and demanding workplace structures, and the cultural biases that permeate and 
perpetuate them, are presented as the norm to be challenged on an ad hoc and individual 
basis.  
b. Dispute resolution procedures  
Any package of rights, to be effective,37 needs to be supported by a solid dispute resolution 
infrastructure that compliments the general tenet of those rights. Unfortunately, as the 
following discussion reveals, the ability of current structures to offer adequate support has 
never been strong in the UK and has been seriously curtailed in recent years. We have 
witnessed a catastrophic shift in the UKs employment dispute resolution provisions that has 
sealed the fate of many who experience unlawful treatment at work. This, it is suggested 
here, has a particularly detrimental impact on those who wish to bring a claim in light of 
unlawful treatment due to pregnancy or maternity – a cohort of workers who have 
historically experienced discrimination and disadvantage at work38 and whose experiences 
are often ignored and unappreciated in mainstream critiques of dispute resolution 
                                                          
36
 The Flexible Working Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/1398). 
37
 See L. Dickens, ‘Employment Tribunals and Alternative Dispute Resolution’ in Dickens, L (ed) Making 
Employment Rights More Effective: Issues of Enforcement and Compliance (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) at 
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11 
 
procedures.39 As discussed in the remainder of this section, their journeys as potential 
litigants are often hampered in ways that can cause individual hardship and reveals the 
inadequacy of the current system as a means of enforcing their legal rights.  
First, in order to bring an action, potential litigants need to be aware of and understand 
their legal rights. Although more accessible in recent years, not least because of the 
enactment of the Equality Act 2010 that consolidated relevant legislation and aided by the 
availability of legal information on-line,40 the law relating to pregnancy and maternity leave 
remains fairly complex and can prove to be an unsurmountable obstacle for some, 
especially the most vulnerable, workers. Those with no access to the internet or those for 
whom English is not a first language or for whom time to research and digest this law is a 
luxury they simply do not have are at a disadvantage. The latter is highly likely if they have 
recently given birth or have other care-giving responsibilities and they are less able to begin 
the journey of evaluating their personal situation within this legal framework. Access to 
legal advice and support is arguably essential to ensure that these individuals can begin to 
evaluate whether or not they have a potential claim: as McDermont and Busby suggest, ‘the 
encounter between advice agency and client is often the point at which a personal issue 
becomes realised as a legal matter as the client is advised that there might be some 
resolution in law to his or her grievance’.41  The significance of professional legal advice in 
the translation of the dispute into a legal claim is also important for maximising the scope of 
the claim and it can mean the difference, for example, of including a claim under the 
Equality Act s18 in the event of a dismissal and hence the possibility of greater 
compensation,42 or realising that the recently imposed two years qualifying period for unfair 
dismissal does not apply in relation to their claims, or assessing the potential for remission 
of tribunal fees (see below).  
However, despite the core benefits of free employment advice, this service has been 
overstretched for many years and all but diminished with the abolition of almost all civil 
legal aid in April 2013: austerity measures mean that approximately £320 million has been 
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 See James, supra n.10.   
40
 Websites such as ACAS, the EHRC and Maternity Action offer up to date information in an accessible format, 
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41
 M. McDermont and N. Busby ‘Workers, marginalised voices and the employment tribunal system: some 
preliminary findings’ (2012) 41 ILJ 166, 174. 
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cut from the annual legal aid budget 43and another £220 million is to be taken out each year 
until 201844. Law centres and CAB offices45 are struggling to stay open and far too many 
have already closed down or turn people away, leaving a void that it is impossible to 
replace. The EHRC, a core source of useful information and advice, has also had its budget 
drastically reduced in recent years: from £70 million to £17.1 million.46 Charities, such as 
Maternity Action and Working Families offer useful on-line support when accessed, but on 
the whole, the gap in terms of legal advice available to workers with a grievance that might 
lead to a claim has, in recent years, become a chasm that is undermining the ability of 
individuals to translate their personal grievance into a potential legal action. Many, 
unfortunately, when faced with the prospect of doing so without any specific legal guidance 
and support are, understandably, reluctant to do so. This is a long standing and common 
problem that has yet to be effectively addressed. In 2005 this ‘litigation gap’47 was stark -  
only about 3% of women who had experienced discrimination of this type took employers to 
employment tribunals and less than 10% took any kind of formal action.48 The 2015 
EHRC/BIS research found that only one in five of those who experienced problems at work 
while pregnant, on maternity leave or returning following maternity leave raised issues, 
formally or informally, with employers.49 Recent cuts jeopardise what is already a precarious 
situation.  
Secondly, the introduction, in 2013, of compulsory early conciliation through ACAS 
adds another layer of potential complexity and elongates the dispute resolution 
process in a way that places responsibility for understanding and articulation of legal 
rights firmly on the shoulders of claimants for longer. In force since May 2014, 
compulsory conciliation requires all claimants notify ACAS of any disputes via a form, 
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 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPO) 
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available on-line. She will be contacted by a conciliation officer in due course and the 
time limit for bringing the claim to a tribunal is ‘paused’ for a month in the first 
instance and for a further 14 days if both parties consent. Hearings are confidential 
and settlements binding. If no settlement is reached a certificate is issued and the 
claimant may lodge a claim at an employment tribunal.  
Overall, the ability of early conciliation to deliver an effective service that responds to 
the needs of the individual parties has been questioned.50 For those who have 
experienced pregnancy or maternity related discrimination, this additional stage of 
the process presents a huge challenge – especially as the commitment required is so 
lengthy and isolating. Claimants are estimated to spend an average of 27 hours on the 
dispute which is a huge commitment for most, especially those with newborns51.  
Moreover, ACAS guidance states that the conciliator does not ‘take a view on the 
merits of a claim or advise whether a claim should be made’ or ‘help prepare either a 
case for tribunal or a defence to a claim’.52 Hence what is marketed as being ‘quicker, 
cheaper and less stressful for all concerned than a tribunal case’53 might be perceived 
negatively by individuals for whom resolution equates to correct enforcement of 
relevant law, as opposed to a means of simply bringing the dispute to an end 
regardless of the merits of the claim. As Dickens notes in relation to the older system 
of ACAS pre-claim conciliation before it was compulsory, but the point is even more 
poignant in this new context, the claimants might look to the conciliation officer to 
redress the imbalance of power that they experience but ACAS ‘act as a broker’ rather 
than ‘an advisor’.54  ACAS administrators have also been perceived as formal and 
managerial in style and prone to push for a speedy resolution of claims and 
negotiation of a financial settlement, with the ultimate aim of preventing a claim from 
reaching a tribunal. Furthermore, it is likely that agreements reached at this stage will 
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award less compensation than the claimant would have been awarded if it had been 
successful at tribunal.  
Third, even if a potential claimant is, in the current climate, able to grapple with the 
legal framework and willing to engage with compulsory conciliation – if she does not 
reach a satisfactory agreement her propensity to enforce her legal rights at an 
employment tribunal is now significantly reduced by the fact that she will probably 
need to pay a substantial fee to do so.55  For many this is the last nail in the coffin and 
there is growing evidence of aggrieved workers with well-founded claims feeling 
unable to pursue an action once aware of the fees.56  In force since July 201357 these 
fees apply to all potential claimants and EAT appellants, unless they qualify for a 
remission which, according to ministers, protects the lowest paid workers, but analysis 
by the TUC has shown that very few households actually benefit from this scheme.58 
There are two levels of fees – issue and hearing fees and the fee level differentiates 
between straight forward (type A) and more complex (type B) claims: for type A cases 
an issue fee of £160 and a hearing fee, if applicable, of £230 is imposed and for type B 
cases an issue fee of £250 and hearing fee of £950 is imposed. If, in due course, the 
claimant wants to appeal the ET decision a further fee of £400 is charged to lodge the 
case at the EAT and £1,200 is charged for the hearing. Pregnancy and maternity 
related discrimination claims, especially when there is a claim for unfair dismissal, are 
likely to be categorised as type B.  It is unsurprising that, since the introduction of 
these fees, tribunal claims have reduced significantly. Initial downturns were stark – 
there was a 79% drop in the number of applications lodged from October to 
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 The government is reviewing tribunal fees: 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/434207/tor-employment-
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December 2013, compared with the same period in 201259 There was a further decline 
as claims for the period October to December 2014 was down 12% on the same 
period the previous year and there has been no revival since.60 These fees, of course, 
need to be placed in the context of a significant rise in the cost of living – which has 
been compounded by widespread pay freezes, and cuts to social security benefits 
(such as child benefit) and the new Conservative Government has announced plans for 
further significant cuts to welfare expenditure, described by the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies as ‘regressive’.61 These fees are a huge deterrent to legal action for many,62 
but for pregnant and new parents the fees have repercussions beyond that of other 
litigants and compounds the difficulties faced when deciding whether or not to pursue 
a claim.  Pregnancy and maternity related discrimination ‘disproportionately affects 
low-paid women workers, who have less economic bargaining power and are more 
likely to be in precarious employment’.63 Moreover, the arrival, or imminent arrival, of 
a new baby has additional financial repercussions – such as baby merchandise, the 
likely cost of leave without the security of paid employment and the potential loss of 
future earning capacity and/ or the future cost of childcare.64  
Flaws in the dispute resolution framework present a challenge for all claimants but pregnant 
workers and new parents,65 albeit to different degrees, face additional considerations that 
make contemplating litigation incredibly difficult. Indeed, it also significantly reduces the 
deterrent effect of the law which could result in increased incidence.66 I suggested, in 2009, 
that pregnant women and new mothers when faced with the reality of bringing an action 
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‘might understandably be exasperated by the whole ordeal’.67 There are now new hurdles 
to be encountered, or at least existing ones have become ridiculously high, in bringing a 
legal action. In June 2013 a BIS Committee of MPs recommended abolition of the tribunal 
fees in pregnancy discrimination cases, noting evidence that ‘the fees will effectively deter 
women with well-founded pregnancy discrimination claims from taking action in the 
tribunal’ and evidence from Sarah Veale of the TUC suggests that ‘women tend to be low-
paid and will be much more likely to be put off litigation simply because they cannot afford 
the risk that they might not get those fees back’.68 The Committee concluded that 
‘pregnancy discrimination, by definition, affects women only and such a financial burden on 
those women would be in direct contradiction with the Government’s aim of removing 
inequality in the workplace’. In addition, the severity of these hurdles is compounded by the 
fact that very few of those who attempt them actually succeed if their cases get to a full 
tribunal hearing69 and many of those who are successful do not receive their full award: one 
in three reported to receive none at all.70   
 
At present, there is a real sense that far too many employers who discriminate against 
pregnant workers and new mothers still ‘get away with it’71 and ten years after the EOC 
declared that ‘we all have greater expectations’ very little has been done to tackle the 
problem.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the voices of those who have experienced 
pregnancy and maternity related discrimination at work: the following anonymous extract 
from the website ‘pregnantthenscrewed’72 was posted on June 23rd 2015. In many ways this 
individual represents the ideal litigant, willing to challenge unlawful behaviour through legal 
means. Unfortunately, she also epitomises the unacceptably high individual sacrifice that is 
needed in such cases and underscores why we need to re-think our approach to the issue as 
a whole.  
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‘Before I got pregnant, I had over 5 years continuous service… At the time that I notified my 
manager I was pregnant, I covered contracts nationally throughout the UK. I was held in 
high regard, my time was very sought after, and I was responsible for the performance of 
over 50 admin staff, as well as developing and maintaining relationships with our clients on 
multi-million pound contracts. Soon after I notified my employer I was pregnant, they 
informed me I would receive only SMP... My employer refused to adhere to the TUPE 
regulations... I raised [a] grievance, and while this happened, a company wide pay rise of 
2.8% was implemented. I was not given the pay rise. I managed to find out that, in a 
company with over 1000 employees, only 7 people had not received that pay rise. 5 of them 
had recently had a promotion and an associated pay increase higher than 2.8%, and 1 was 
leaving before the pay increase would be implemented. The 7th person was me. 
…I chose to take my case to tribunal…This was all throughout my pregnancy, and added a 
huge amount of stress, worry and upset during a really difficult time in my life. I did not 
enjoy my pregnancy at all… the [tribunal] date was set for when my son was 12 weeks old. I 
was representing myself up until this point and with a newborn I just couldn’t manage any 
more on my own... I found a local legal firm and sought advice, they agreed to represent me 
at my 5 day tribunal for a fixed fee of £4000. I …borrowed the money. Now I had the added 
worry of the debt. 
…The tribunal went ahead. I had to leave my 12 week old baby for 5 full days. I had to pump 
breastmilk in a room with my legal representation and her student present (I used a cover 
but it’s not quite the same as privacy!) as that was the only available space. I had to ask the 
tribunal office to store my milk in their fridge. It was embarrassing and demeaning.  
After a harrowing week… the tribunal… found that my employer [had] discriminated against 
me on the basis of my gender in 3 separate instances… They also ruled that the employer 
had excluded me from the national pay rise unlawfully and that they must apply it both 
immediately and retrospectively to the date it was originally issued… My employer offered 
me an out of court settlement and I accepted it.’ 
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3. Care ethics 
The discussion above provides a clear illustration of law’s struggle to, in Herring’s words, 
‘respond to issues which are not readily reducible to an economic value nor expressed in 
terms of individualised rights’.73 The law here, as elsewhere, fails to reflect the 
interdependent nature of care relationships and constructs relevant provisions as a bundle 
of specific individual rights rather than a means of enabling realistic choices and agency 
within families74. In this section I argue in favour of an approach that helps challenge the 
current marginalisation of care, contending that care ethics might be utilised to help 
illuminate and counter the damaging trends discussed above.  
Originally Gilligan’s ethic of care75 sought simply to challenge implicit gendered assumptions 
about moral development and reasoning in young boys and girls – arguing that they were 
‘different’ but that females are not less efficient than males in this regard.  Gilligan’s work 
has since received considerable negative attention, especially from dominance theorists76 
and its valorisation of a ‘female voice’ has been viewed as problematic77 - believed to 
associate care with women and hence perpetuate a norm that excludes men, or presents 
male carers as the exception to the rule.78 One does not, however, have to subscribe to the 
view that all females are innately caring, self-sacrificing and nurturing (or any more capable 
of these traits than men)79 to assert, as I do here, that greater promotion of an ethic of care 
could radically transform institutions and legal rights and the values that underpin them in 
this context.  Indeed, her work has been developed from a range of perspectives80 and its 
significance is in, as Herring put it, ‘the hope that it offer[s] a new approach to ethical 
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analysis’.81  At its core is a belief that care, although it varies across a person’s life course, is 
a universal experience and need and a valuable endeavour that deserves to be better 
recognised.  Hence, many care ethicists promote the view that mutual care is essential and 
dispute any claim that it is a gendered phenomenon. As Tronto put it, ‘care is not a 
parochial concern of women, a type of secondary moral question, or the work of the least 
well off in society. Care is a central concern of human life’.82  Those who favour an approach 
that centralises an ethic care challenge traditional liberal theories and their ‘pretence’ of 
independence and valorisation of the concept of ‘choice’ – traits that are often difficult for 
carers to relate to.83 Once we accept these overarching traits of care ethics, its appeal in 
relation to critiquing law’s engagement with care-work (formal or informal) is clear84 as it 
calls us to ‘change our political and social institutions to reflect this truth’.85 In political 
terms Sevenhuijsen, usefully for the purpose of this piece, describes care ethics as 
encapsulating ‘a constructive critical perspective on the norm of independent citizenship’86 
and suggests that it requires policies centred upon,  
‘the attainment of a situation in which everybody can take care of themselves and others, 
by practising in the course of their lives those combinations of economic responsibility and 
the responsibility for daily care which suit their situation and needs, and those of the 
persons who are dependent upon them’.87    
For the purpose of this piece, an injection of an ethic of care calls for the necessity of care-
giving and inevitability of interdependence between all individuals across our life course to 
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be reflected more prominently within the employment laws and the processes and 
institutions that support this package of rights. Our historical and ongoing failure to include 
consideration of care in this way when drafting social policy and enforcing laws that impinge 
upon the lives of pregnant workers and working carers means that whilst we have created a 
superficially attractive framework of rights, it lacks the quality that might have been 
achieved had it been constructed with an ethic of care in mind. It might also, had care ethics 
informed the relevant policy formation agenda, have lessened the impact of dominant neo-
liberal concerns that are apparent in the recent reform of dispute resolution procedures. 
Three examples illustrate how this (re)focus might alter key approaches to this area of social 
policy.  
First, a greater commitment to care ethics can help promote men’s role as care-giver.  
Caregiving is slowly becoming less gendered in terms of our approach to it and, in practice, 
male and female identities as carers and workers are beginning to shift88. The desire to 
encourage men to take on a greater share of care-work has been discussed for some time89, 
often constructed as a means of helping promote equal parenting90 and reducing the 
‘burden’ of care91 or enabling women to participate in the workplace more or at a higher 
level. More, however, needs to be done92 in this field and an approach motivated by the 
core beliefs of care ethics could help transform the legal framework by challenging its 
individualistic approach and supporting the shifts we are witnessing by encouraging a better 
distribution of care responsibilities between individuals and communities: in fact helping 
(re)focus attention away from individual working mothers (or fathers) and onto families, 
communities and the welfare state. Women’s participation in the labour market has been 
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compromised because care-work has been individualised and assigned to women93 and care 
ethics challenge this construction. It requires a greater appreciation of the need to move 
beyond the traditional breadwinner/home-maker divide, not because of concern for equal 
parenting or women’s (in)ability to function in the labour market and provide care,94 but 
because it fundamentally recognises that we are all responsible for and all capable of 
providing care for others. Indeed, history demonstrates that the equality principle is still 
fundamentally incapable, without some radical reshaping, of advancing men’s role in terms 
of care-giving.95 Fredman calls for an explicit commitment to the social value of 
parenthood96 and a greater commitment to care ethics could help facilitate this. In addition, 
care ethics can alter how we define care in this context by challenging the way that labour 
market participation and market values have been viewed as diametrically opposed to, and 
intrinsically in competition with, care-work.97   
There have been various legal changes in the UK that have purportedly sought to encourage 
men’s role as care-givers, including the  paternity and APL provisions and, more recently, 
the right to claim SPL.  All these attempts, whilst commendable at a superficial level, have 
been flawed in many ways and would have benefitted if they had been constructed with 
care ethics in mind.  For example, whilst SPL offers some superficial recognition that 
parenting is, or should be, a gender neutral undertaking, the practical complexity of the 
provision, the poor payment available, and the fact that it has been developed alongside a 
long standing, more simplistic ‘fall back’ of relying solely on the traditional, ‘tried and 
tested’, maternity leave option, undermines its potential to promote more male care-giving 
during the first year of the child’s life.  A policy does not have to be overtly gendered to 
have normative cores that are implicitly gendered and perpetuate the notion that care work 
is, predominantly, a female undertaking.98 SPL appears to promote a more gender neutral 
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approach to care that will challenge traditional ideologies of motherhood and fatherhood 
but in practice favours, and is likely to perpetuate, the current status quo whereby mothers 
predominantly undertake the majority of childcare responsibilities. The SPL provision has 
not been adequately funded or promoted and it remains difficult for working parents to, 
drawing on Williams’s useful terminology, ‘un-bend’99 gendered constructions of 
childcare/workplace relations, and those that attempt to do so will have to overcome more 
hurdles and might be disadvantaged economically as a result. A commitment to care ethics 
might have helped provide a less complex piece of legislation that offered day-one rights, 
reduced the notification requirements and reconsidered the pay available. Indeed,  such an 
approach might have led the Government to favour a different model entirely -   such as a 
simpler, non-transferable gender specific allocation of leave subject to ‘use it or lose it’ 
conditions and paid at a rate that replaces a high degree of lost income.100  
Secondly, care ethics could also provide a means of improving the current dispute resolution 
system because the value it places on care-work requires that we remain vigilant to the 
potential impact of the procedures upon those who are pregnant or have care-giving 
responsibilities.  Here, the value of care-work and its impact on law enforcement and access 
to justice has been completely ignored.  Compulsory conciliation, for example, is 
constructed as the first step of the employment tribunal system procedure and this recent 
reform, like others before it,101 is more concerned with reducing recourse to tribunals than 
with improving the effectiveness of dispute resolution or promoting broader social policy 
objectives. This conceptualisation manifests itself in the way that success or failure is often 
measured102: there is an assumption that a speedy resolution of claims caters for the needs 
of all litigants and yet, as suggested elsewhere,103 this is not always the case for pregnant 
workers and new mothers.  Moreover, the current dispute resolution model demonstrates 
no willingness to investigate or accommodate the practical and emotional needs of women, 
like the litigant quoted above, who have been treated unlawfully because of pregnancy or 
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maternity. The debate surrounding tribunal fees, referred to above, provides further 
evidence of harm experienced as a result of a core failure to recognise the implications of 
care-work upon a person’s ability to access justice following a dispute at work.  The 
ramifications of this lack of attention to the lived reality for these individuals are difficult to 
quantify but potentially huge: as stated elsewhere, ‘these well-intentioned procedures 
might operate in a way that marginalises those involved in pregnancy-parenting/workplace 
disputes’.104 In sum, policy makers in this field still remain ‘deaf’, in Conaghan’s sense of the 
word,105 to the needs of these (potential) litigants and a greater regard for the care-work 
they undertake could shift our approach so as to enable their voices to be heard, and 
encourage investigations of a more innovative organisation of litigation support in 
general.106  
 
Thirdly, care ethics can help promote a framework of rights that better incorporates the 
needs and perspectives of those receiving care. Care ethics view people as relational, 
recognising that their own interests are often tied up with a concern for the interests of 
others. Yet, as Herring suggests, laws often ‘fall into the trap of isolating the interests of 
each party’107 whereas ‘approaches based on an ethic of care require the development of 
legal tools which recognise that separating interests into individual rights is impossible and 
undesirable’.108  In relation to family-friendly laws, I have criticised elsewhere how child 
welfare and eldercare concerns109 have been marginalised. Care ethics help challenge this 
marinalisation and the overall tenet of this legal framework’s focus by allowing the complex 
realities of interdependence to be at its core:  the reciprocity of care and its impact on 
everyone’s lives including the needs of the children and adults for whom working carers 
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care are not what has driven policy innovation in this area. If that were the case, we might 
be provided with provisions that better explore and facilitate children’s needs beyond the 
first year - the focus of the majority of the legislation. As Fredman puts it, ‘participative 
parenting is not confined to the first year of life, but extends throughout the child’s school 
age years’.110 We might also better encapsulate the realities of those with eldercare 
responsibilities – a type of care that differs, in so many ways, from childcare and requires a 
more nuanced approach.111  
 
Care ethics could encourage, through recognition that care along with labour market 
demands ‘does not have an unchanging place in today’s society’,112 the development of 
more flexible policies so as to reflect that care needs change across time. It might, for 
example, facilitate changes to our current right to request provisions so that where conflicts 
arise between competing employees for flexibility the needs of working carers are 
prioritised above the desires of other workers, and this could be promoted in recognition of 
workers’ needs but also, and preferably, to recognise the intermingled interests of those for 
whom they care. In addition, any agreed arrangement could also require ongoing review so 
as to accommodate the changing nature of care-giving and workplace demands and choices. 
At present there is little or no space given to this reality within the current legal framework. 
As a consequence, carers and recipients of care often have little choice but to resign 
themselves to traditional, often gendered, models of care-giving in order to accommodate 
care-work and workplace participation.   
 
Conclusion  
This discussion suggests how greater commitment to an ethic of care could alter the 
boundaries and nature of relevant laws and procedures in this field. Placing carers and 
recipients of care at the centre of dialogues can challenge the often unconscious, but 
resilient, over-privileging of the ideal unencumbered worker and allow a space for 
growth in awareness about, and a willingness to engage with the changing realities of 
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care-giving and workplace participation in the 21st century. This can, if incorporated 
into business ‘good practice’, challenge current constructions of what a ‘good’ worker 
looks like and allow all workers where, or rather when, relevant, to reveal the true 
implications of the interdependent realities of their lives and find means of 
accommodating that reality. This would allow us to progress beyond the façade that 
Bridgeman articulated when she suggested that,  
‘[the] work of caring for dependents and emotional interdependency with our 
children, spouses, partners and families must remain concealed lest we appear not to 
be independent souls suited for the public world’.113   
Overall, had care ethics informed this area of policy formation we may have witnessed 
more meaningful progress in this area of employment law. Instead, we have created a 
ridged framework that continues to promote, prioritise and reward autonomy, 
individualism and market-making above informal (unpaid) care-giving: one that still 
expects families, often women, to absorb the majority of care work.114 Moreover, 
dependence is still implicitly constructed as a negative and undesirable trait and its 
messy implications for laws, legal procedures and workplace practices are not aired let 
alone tackled. Working carers still need, in order to manage working life or gain legal 
redress when conflicts arise, to fit into systems and public spaces that were not 
designed with them in mind – spaces that have failed to respond to the changing 
realities of modern life. In sum, improvements require constant vigilance against any 
inherent biases that operate in such a way as to counter the needs of care-giving 
relationships – the ‘blind spots to what caring entails on a daily basis’.115 Yet, without a 
fundamental shift in our approach, it is unlikely that we will ever adequately challenge 
these ‘blind spots’ and ‘create social spaces in which people can practise care, 
responsibility and trust in relation to material and immaterial things that matter in 
their lives’.116  
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